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Enforcement of the Americans with
Disabilities Act:
Remedying “Abusive” Litigation While
Strengthening Disability Rights
Evelyn Clark *
Abstract
This Note explores the Americans with Disabilities Act and
the private litigation used to enforce compliance. While the ADA
was designed to be enforced by private citizens, many have called
for reform to limit what they see as “abusive” litigants. This Note
focuses on (1) the perceived problem of vexatious litigants
abusing the ADA and its state counterparts to benefit monetarily,
(2) the attempted solutions on both a state and federal level, and
(3) recommended solutions that focus on protecting the rights of
individuals with disabilities while limiting abusive litigation
meant to extort businesses.
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I. Introduction
“This is not a case to vindicate a disabled person’s rights; it
is a case brought to extract a money settlement from a restaurant
in Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the ADA’s jurisdictional
hook to achieve that goal.” 1
1.
Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC), 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017).
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“Serial plaintiffs, like Molski, serve as ‘professional pawns
in an ongoing scheme to bilk attorney’s fees.’ It is a ‘type of
shotgun litigation [that] undermines both the spirit and purpose
of the ADA.” 2
“The current ADA lawsuit binge is, therefore, essentially
driven by economics—that is, the economics of attorney’s fees.” 3
“The Act was never intended to turn a lofty and salutary
mission into a fee-generating mill for some lawyers to exploit the
statutory scheme to see how many billable hours they could cram
into a case before it is either tried or settled. They do a disservice
to the disabled . . . .” 4
“Physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a
person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society.” 5
One of these quotes is not like the others. The Americans
with Disabilities Act was enacted to eradicate discrimination
against individuals with disabilities, but some say there have
been unintended consequences. 6 The law was designed to be
enforced by private citizens filing suits against noncompliant
and inaccessible businesses. 7 Unfortunately, Congress did not
anticipate the unintended consequences of plaintiffs and
attorneys abusing the system for monetary gain. 8 Some courts
have painted a picture of a vicious “cottage industry”—litigants
2.
Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (citations omitted).
3.
Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
4.
Brother v. Miami Hotel Invs., Ltd., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (S.D.
Fla. 2004).
5.
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018).
6.
See id. (providing eight overarching findings, which necessitated the
creation of the ADA).
7.
See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the
congressional intent to put enforcement in the hands of private citizens).
8.
See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the
congressional intent to put enforcement in the hands of private citizens).

692

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 689 (2020)

and their attorneys abusing the system for monetary gain
through settlements and attorney’s fees.” 9 While some litigants
may exploit the ADA, many advocates remain committed to
using the law for its intended purpose: Achieving equality for
disabled Americans. 10 These individuals and their attorneys,
regardless of their motives, have faced frequent negative press
coverage, unpopular public opinion, and increasing beratement
from courts. 11
Media outlets often tell the stories of greedy individuals
targeting unassuming small business owners who were
unaware of the ADA and their noncompliance (despite the law
having been in effect since 1990). 12 The popular podcast This
American Life produced an episode entitled “Crybabies” in
9.
See Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280–82 (M.D.
Fla. 2004) (arguing that the recovery of attorney’s fees under the ADA has led
to a “cottage industry” of plaintiffs and attorneys attempting to make money
off the statute); see also Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860,
863 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that this “shotgun litigation” is an ongoing
scheme to bilk attorney’s fees); see also Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F.
Supp. 2d 1368, 1374–75 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (deciding that plaintiff had not
sufficiently established a credible threat of future injury and was only involved
in a “vexatious litigation tactic” to recover monetary damages or attorney’s
fees).
10.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining why the ADA
was enacted).
11.
See Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (“This is not a
case to vindicate a disabled person’s rights; it is a case brought to extract a
money settlement from a restaurant in Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the
ADA’s jurisdictional hook to achieve that goal.”); see also Brother v. Miami
Hotel Invs., Ltd., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“[Lawyers
exploiting the ADA] do a disservice to the disabled . . . .”); see also Walter
Olson, The ADA Shakedown Racket, CITY J. (Winter 2004), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/ada-shakedown-racket-12494.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2020) (“The good faith of these complainants in many of these suits is open to
doubt.”) [https://perma.cc/LHS7-C2D2].
12.
Amy Shipley & John Maines, South Florida Leads Nation in
Controversial Disability Lawsuits, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 11, 2014), https://
www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2014-01-11-fl-disability-lawsuits-strikesf-20140112-story.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (“Local business owners
say they are being extorted by a handful of serial-filing lawyers more
concerned with turning profits than helping the disabled.”) [https://perma.cc
/MH9J-TZEQ].
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2010. 13 The episode’s description reads: “Crybabies are
annoying. They whine, they complain, sometimes they ruin it
for the rest of us. But being a crybaby can be a really effective
tactic.” 14 The third segment of the podcast introduces Tom
Mundy, a disabled individual and disability rights lawyer who
has filed hundreds of lawsuits under the ADA. 15 The segment’s
description begins:
In California, a kind of crybaby cottage industry has popped
up around, of all things, the Americans with Disabilities
Act—the federal law that requires public places to meet a
minimum level of accessibility. Some people make a living by
suing business owners for not being up to code. Alex
MacInnis hung out with one of them. 16

The fifteen-minute segment presents a brief but poignant
case study of how able-bodied people interact with individuals
with disabilities. Mr. Mundy, a disabled lawyer fighting for ADA
compliance, takes the journalists to a nearby business to
demonstrate how frustrating inaccessibility can be. 17 He backs
into an “accessible” parking space, explaining that the striped
blue lines are not big enough for him to unload the ramp from
his van and maneuver his wheelchair out of the car. 18 Mr.
Mundy unfolds his ramp to demonstrate. 19 The journalist
immediately questions whether Mundy can actually get out of
the van or not. 20 Then MacInnis states cavalierly, “Well, I’d love
to see you try.” 21 The instant condescension and disbelief of Mr.
Mundy’s struggle drips from the journalist’s voice. 22 Disabled
13.
Ira Glass, This American Life: Crybabies, WBEZ (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/415/transcript
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/N6BW-5US8].
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
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individuals listening to the podcast can likely relate to Mr.
Mundy’s frustration, not only with the lack of accessibility in
public places, but with the constant pressure from able-bodied
individuals to prove one’s disability.
Throughout the segment, little weight is given to the fact
that some businesses in the area have fixed their inaccessible
parking because of Mr. Mundy’s work. 23 Instead, the journalist
narrates, “Tom, like a handful of other people in California,
makes his living by [suing under the ADA], over and over. He
has no other job. It’s his sole means of support.” 24 Whimsical
music begins in the background, evoking images of luxury and
ease, painting Mr. Mundy as a carefree and well-to-do leech on
the system. 25 Litigating under the ADA is depicted as nothing
more than a money-grabbing scheme for “crybabies” to exploit
businesses and make millions. 26
As both a wheelchair user and a fan of the show, I was
shocked and saddened to hear disabled individuals being
branded as “crybabies” for fighting for equality. This sentiment,
however, is not rare. 27 Countless news articles feature titles
such as “The ADA Lawsuit Contagion Sweeping U.S. States” 28
or “Florida’s Serial ADA Lawsuits: Long Overdue or ‘Legal
Extortion’?” 29 Press coverage almost always focuses on the
23.

Id.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
See Casey L. Raymond, A Growing Threat to the ADA: An Empirical
Study of Mass Filings, Popular Backlash, and Potential Solutions Under Titles
II and III, 18 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 235, 237 (2013) (discussing This American
Life’s “Crybabies” episode as well as the frequent negative coverage of mass
plaintiff filings under the ADA).
28.
See Ken Barnes, The ADA Lawsuit Contagion Sweeping U.S. States,
FORBES (Dec. 22, 2016 11:05AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016
/12/22/the-ada-lawsuit-contagion-sweeping-u-s-states/#3730448634ee
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2020) (discussing the vast amount of ADA litigation) [https://
perma.cc/MW7V-4BV5].
29.
See Raychel Lean, Florida’s Serial ADA Lawsuits: Long Overdue or
‘Legal Extortion’?, DAILY BUS. REV. (Nov. 1, 2018 10:04AM), https://
www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/11/01/floridas-serial-ada-lawsuitslong-overdue-or-legal-extortion/?slreturn=20190127222824 (last visited Mar.
24.
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sensationalized and unsympathetic serial plaintiffs who are
abusing the system, giving little exposure to the view that some
serial litigants are advocates fighting for equal rights. 30 One
such article states:
No one exemplifies the emergent disability-shakedown
industry better than the wheelchair-using Louie, whose past
includes multiple felony convictions on assault, grand-theft,
and other charges—though he says he is straight with the
law today, having after all prospered as one of its enforcers.
Over the years, he has filed at least 500 lawsuits . . . . Some
of his individual settlements have reached $100,000 . . . . 31

Negative media coverage has the ability to affect public
opinion of disability-rights activists, individuals with
disabilities, and the legal profession that supports them. 32 “The
negative press coverage has even translated into legislation,
including California’s recently passed law protecting small
businesses from predatory ADA lawsuits.” 33 Legislation has
repeatedly been introduced on the state and federal level in an
attempt to curb vexatious ADA litigation. 34 Although cries for
ADA reform may be warranted, legislators hoping to protect
business interests must remember the fundamental purpose of
the ADA: To protect disabled individuals’ right to equal access
and opportunity. 35
25, 2020) (discussing the vast amount of ADA litigation) [https://perma.cc
/X2DT-M2Q3].
30.
See Patrick S. Pemberton, Arizona Pedophile Sues 6 SLO County
Businesses for Alleged ADA Violations, THE TRIB. (Feb. 6, 2015, 6:20PM),
https://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/local/article39511665.html (last visited
on Mar. 25, 2020) (“A convicted pedophile from Arizona with a litigious past
has sued six local businesses, saying their facilities did not comply with the
[ADA]. Meanwhile, a bill currently pending at the statehouse seeks to limit
the impact of such lawsuits, which some describe as predatory.”)
[https://perma.cc/LJF7-BAEE].
31.
Olson, supra note 11.
32.
See Pemberton, supra note 30 (including quotes such as “as a local
community member I am outraged” and “It’s just so sad hearing about these”
in an article on ADA litigation).
33.
Raymond, supra note 27.
34.
See infra notes 63–76 (discussing proposed and enacted legislation to
curb vexatious litigation on the state and national level).
35.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018) (explaining why the ADA was enacted).
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This Note explores the Americans with Disabilities Act and
(1) its unintended consequence of abuse in the legal system, (2)
previous attempts to curb that abuse, and (3) potential
recommendations to shield businesses from abusive lawsuits
while protecting disabled individuals’ rights. First, this Note
will explore why abusive litigation is happening, where it occurs
the most, who is filing, and who is benefitting. Second, this Note
will analyze the solutions attempted through state law, federal
legislation, and alternate means. Third, this Note will propose
solutions for the legal profession, state and federal legislative
bodies, and the disability community as a whole.
II. The Problem
A. Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act
On July 26, 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act to establish a clear and comprehensive
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability. 36 The
ADA’s official acronym is now the ADAAA after it was amended
most recently in 2008 to reaffirm the broad scope of the term
“disability.” 37 Although the ADA is now the ADAAA, this Note
will use the acronym “ADA” for ease of reading.
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public
accommodations and services operated by private entities. 38
This includes anything from restaurants and bars to hotels and
gyms. 39 Title III states that “it shall be discriminatory to subject
36.

42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2018).
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. No. 325, 122 Stat.
3553 (finding that the definition of disability under the ADA had not been
interpreted consistently and further narrowed the broad scope of protection
intended to be afforded by the ADA).
38.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (outlawing discrimination by public
accommodations and services operated by private entities).
39.
See id. § 12181(7) (including the substantive list of places of lodging
(hotels), exhibitions of entertainment (movie theaters), food or drink
establishments (bars and restaurants), shopping centers (grocery and clothing
stores), service establishments (laundromats, gas stations, professional
offices), public displays or collections (museums and libraries), places of
recreation (parks, zoos, amusement parks), private schools (from nurseries to
37.
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an individual or class of individuals on the basis of
disability . . . to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or
class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an
entity.” 40
This discrimination includes “a failure to remove
architectural barriers, and communication barriers that are
structural in nature, in existing facilities . . . where such
removal is readily achievable.” 41 If an entity demonstrates that
the removal of a barrier is not readily achievable, it should make
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations available through alternative methods if such
methods are readily achievable. 42 Factors to determine whether
an accommodation is readily achievable include the nature and
cost of the action, the financial resources of the facility, and the
type of operations of the entity. 43
To enforce the accessibility requirement of Title III, the
ADA authorizes (1) a private right of action, and (2) a right of
action by the Attorney General. 44 Private plaintiffs initiating
civil action are entitled to injunctive relief remedying the
violation and attorney’s fees and costs. 45 Injunctive relief
includes an order to alter facilities to make them readily
accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities. 46 The
ADA allows for reasonable attorney’s fees, including litigation
expenses and costs, to encourage individuals to file claims and
keep businesses accountable. 47
postgraduate education), social services establishments (day care centers,
homeless shelters, adoption agencies), places of exercise (gymnasiums, health
spas, golf courses)).
40.
Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
41.
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v).
42.
See id. § 12181(9) (defining “readily achievable” as easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense).
43.
Id. § 12181(9)(A)–(D).
44.
Id. § 12188(b).
45.
Id.
46.
Id. § 12188(a)(2).
47.
See id. § 12205 (allowing for the prevailing party to be granted a
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs).
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The Attorney General’s right to action differs slightly from
private plaintiffs’. 48 Notably, the court may award monetary
damages to aggrieved individuals when requested by the
Attorney General. 49 The civil penalty against the entity may not
exceed $50,000 for the first violation or $100,000 for any
subsequent violation. 50 The court may also consider good faith
efforts to comply with the Act when considering what amount of
civil penalty may be appropriate. 51
The differing remedies demonstrate “Congress’s underlying
intent to prevent private plaintiffs from recovering monetary
relief under the ADA.” 52 To emphasize this intent, Congress
outlined the specific conditions that may warrant an award of
monetary damages. 53 Monetary relief may be awarded by a
court to vindicate the public interest in a civil action that was
brought by the Attorney General. 54 “By specifying the
circumstances under which monetary relief will be available,
Congress evinced its intent that these damages would be
available in no other[] [circumstance].” 55 Anti-discrimination
litigation does not allow for recovery of monetary damages

48.
See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (explaining the
differences between the Attorney General’s right to action when compared to
private plaintiffs’).
49.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(B) (stating that in a civil action, the court
“may award such other relief as the court considers to be appropriate,
including monetary damages to persons aggrieved when requested by the
Attorney General”).
50.
Id. § 12188(b)(2)(C).
51.
See id. §12188(b)(5) (defining good faith by allowing the court to
consider whether the entity could have reasonably anticipated the need for an
appropriate type of auxiliary aid needed to accommodate the unique needs of
a particular individual with a disability).
52.
Carri Becker, Private Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities
Act via Serial Litigation: Abusive or Commendable?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 93, 97 (2006).
53.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (2018) (granting courts the ability to award
monetary damages when requested by the Attorney General or to vindicate
the public interest).
54.
Id. § 12188(b)(2)(B)–(C).
55.
Am. Bus. Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

699

because plaintiffs are seeking to vindicate the policy of the
United States, not seek redress of their own injuries. 56
B. States Awarding Monetary Damages Under the ADA
Some states, however, have enacted their own
anti-discrimination statutes allowing for the recovery of
monetary damages for accessibility lawsuits. 57 Plaintiffs in such
states may “circumvent the will of Congress by seeking money
damages while retaining federal jurisdiction.” 58 For example, in
California, because a violation of the ADA also constitutes a
violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs can
sue in federal court for injunctive relief under the ADA while
collecting money damages under California’s state statute. 59
States that allow for monetary damages under their own
anti-discrimination statutes experience more accessibility
lawsuits than those who do not provide for additional recovery. 60
Statistics of geographically concentrated ADA litigation have

56.
See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)
(explaining the difference between statutes allowing for recovery of attorney’s
fees to encourage litigants and monetary damages).
57.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b) (2018) (granting plaintiffs of private civil
actions the remedy of injunctive relief and attorney’s fees); see also, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 41-1492.08(C) (2017) (granting “appropriate relief” including
intangible damages to plaintiffs in Arizona); CAL. CIV CODE § 52(a) (West 2015)
(establishing minimum damages of $4,000 to aggrieved plaintiffs in
California); FLA. STAT. § 760.11(5) (2015) (allowing Florida plaintiffs to recover
for compensatory damages including mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other
intangible injuries).
58.
Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
59.
See id. at 862–63 (“Plaintiffs can sue in federal court for injunctive
relief under the ADA, and tack on state law claims for money damages under
the Unruh Act and CDPA.”).
60.
See Minh Vu et al., 2014 May Be a Banner Year for ADA Title III
Lawsuit Filings, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Aug. 5, 2014), https://
www.adatitleiii.com/2014/08/2014-may-be-a-banner-year-for-ada-title-iiilawsuit-filings/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (citing California and Florida as
the two states which consistently had the highest number of ADA lawsuits
nationwide) [https://perma.cc/TLC6-Z2DY].
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raised concern over plaintiffs’ motivations for filing suit. 61
Repeat plaintiffs’ incentives may be to recover monetarily
through litigation or settlement rather than enforcing the ADA
and promoting accessibility. 62
All but a few states have adopted their own version of the
ADA. 63 Most, however, do not allow for additional remedies
outside of the federal statute. 64 For example, the Virginia
Human Rights Act emphasizes that the policy of the
Commonwealth is “to safeguard all individuals within the
Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because
of . . . disability.” 65 The statute has an entire section
highlighting that the Human Rights Act (VHRA) does not allow
for additional causes of action. 66 “Nothing in this

61.
See Kristina M. Launey et al., ADA Title III Lawsuits Increase by 16%
in 2017 Due Largely to Website Access Lawsuits; Physical Accessibility
Legislative Reform Efforts Continue, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.adatitleiii.com/2018/02/ada-title-iii-lawsuits-increase-by-14percent-in-2017-due-largely-to-website-access-lawsuits-physical-accessibilitylegislative-reform-efforts-continue/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (noting
California and Florida as the two states with consistently highest ADA
lawsuits with 2,751 and 1,488 respectively out of 7,663 suits total in the
United States in 2017 and New York doubling its 543 lawsuits in 2016 to 1,023
in 2017) [https://perma.cc/6CLY-C5RB].
62.
See Cankat v. 41st Ave. Rest. Corp., No. 15 CV 4963 (SJ) (MDG), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171406, at *12–13 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (addressing the
plaintiff and his attorney’s reputation as serial filers who target small
businesses that default or settle with nearly identical claims to recover
monetary damages and attorney’s fees, claiming they “mock” the ADA’s
mission as a trailblazing civil rights law).
63.
See Stephen A. Rosenbaum et al., Disability Rights and Public
Accommodations: State-by-State, SOUTHEAST ADA CTR. (Feb. 2011), https://
adasoutheast.org/publications/ada/public_accommodations_disability_rights
_state-by-state_Final.pdf (“Many states have their own disability rights law
that complement the Americans with Disabilities Act.”) [https://perma.cc
/KJ38-63ST].
64.
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3903 (2014) (explaining that Virginia’s
statute does not create any additional rights of action from the ADA); with
CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (2015) (allowing for actual damages of no less than
$4,000 for noncompliance).
65.
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900(B)(1) (2001).
66.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3903 (2014) (“Nothing in this chapter or in
Article 4 (§ 2.2-520 et seq.) or Chapter 5 creates, nor shall it be construed to
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chapter . . . creates . . . an independent or private cause of
action to enforce its provisions . . . .” 67 Causes of action based on
the public policies of the VHRA are exclusively limited to those
actions, procedures, and remedies afforded by applicable federal
or state civil rights statutes. 68
In contrast, Illinois and New York allow for recovery of
actual damages for injury, loss, or other remedies as may be
necessary to “make the complainant whole.” 69 States may set a
minimum or maximum amount of damages for which a plaintiff
may recover. 70 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act establishes
recovery of actual damages of no less than $4,000 in addition to
attorney’s fees. 71 California has also enacted the Californians
with Disabilities Act, which allows for actual damages of no less
than $1,000 for those who deny or interfere with enjoyment of
public facilities. 72
In contrast to California’s minimum penalties,
Pennsylvania and Florida have set maximum penalty
amounts. 73 Pennsylvania allows for the awarding of actual
damages including (1) reimbursement of travel expenses related
to the claim, and (2) compensation for loss of work, but the state
law sets maximum penalties based on the respondent’s prior
create, an independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions,
except as specifically provided in subsections B and C.”).
67.
Id. § 2.2-3903(A).
68.
Id. § 2.2-3903(D).
69.
See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8A-104 (1989) (allowing Illinois plaintiffs
to recover for damages to make the complainant whole); see also N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 2019) (allowing New York plaintiffs to recover for
punitive damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate).
70.
See infra notes 71–76 (explaining how some states have set minimum
and maximum penalties).
71.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
72.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.3(a) (1996) (stating that a person may not be
liable for damages pursuant to both the CDA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act
for the same action).
73.
See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 959 (2020) (establishing that penalties
should not exceed $10,000 if the respondent had not committed any prior
discriminatory practice or $25,000 if the respondent committed one other
discriminatory practice within a five-year period); see also FLA. STAT.
§ 760.11(5) (2015) (limiting punitive damages to no more than $100,000).
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offenses. 74 Florida’s Civil Rights Act allows for compensatory
damages which may include back pay, attorney’s fees, damages
for mental anguish, loss of dignity, any other intangible injuries,
and punitive damages. 75 The statute further specifies that
punitive damages shall not exceed $100,000. 76
C. Geographic Concentrations of ADA Litigation
Title III lawsuits have increased dramatically over the
course of the ADA’s lifetime, especially in states allowing for
recovery of monetary damages. 77 In 2012, there were 2,495
federal ADA Title III lawsuits, compared to 7,663 in 2017. 78
More suits were filed in federal court in the first half of 2016
than in all of 2013. 79 California and Florida consistently remain
the top two states for disability litigation, with 2,751 in
California and 1,488 in Florida in 2017. 80 More than one in
every five federal disabled-access lawsuits in 2013 originated in
the Southern District of Florida. 81 Between 2009 and 2014,
disabled-access lawsuits in South Florida increased by 500
percent. 82
D. Repeat Plaintiffs Filing “Boilerplate” Complaints
Accessibility lawsuits tend to be brought by repeat plaintiffs
and counsel, who are sometimes working with a disability rights
organization. 83 Many courts have flippantly referred to these
74.

43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 959 (proposed).
FLA. STAT. § 760.11(5) (2015).
76.
Id.
77.
See Launey et al., supra note 61 (analyzing the increase in litigation
and which states received the most complaints).
78.
See id. (analyzing the increase in litigation and which states received
the most complaints); see also Vu et al., supra note 60 (noting an increase from
2,495 lawsuits in 2012 to 2,719 lawsuits in 2013).
79.
Vu et al., supra note 60.
80.
Id.
81.
Shipley & Maines, supra note 12.
82.
Id.
83.
See Norkunas v. RNA LLC, No. 3-11-0281, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45456, *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2013) (noting that the plaintiff and her counsel
75.
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litigants as “vexatious.” 84 A vexatious suit is defined as a
“lawsuit instituted maliciously and without good grounds,
meant to create trouble and expense for the party being sued.” 85
Five hundred and seventy-nine cases were filed by only five
organizations (and a few of their associated members) in
Florida’s Middle District. 86 Numerous anecdotal cases support
the assertion that ADA litigation tends to be brought by repeat
attorneys or law firms. 87 Typically, attorneys work with one or

had filed 43 ADA cases throughout the country); see also Rodriguez v. Investco,
LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (noting the plaintiff’s 200
lawsuits over “the past few years” along with the same counsel); see also Access
4 All, Inc. v. HI 57 Hotel, LLC, No. 04 Civ. 6620 (GBD)(FM), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2695, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that plaintiff in the present case
had commenced more than seventy-five actions alleging ADA violations in the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York); see also Molski v. Mandarin
Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that the
plaintiff had filed more than 400 federal lawsuits alleging violations of the
ADA); see also John D. Meer & Myra B. Villamor, Denying Serial ADA
Plaintiffs Access to Your Pocketbooks: The Case for Fighting: A Success Story,
LEXOLOGY
(May
29,
2012),
https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=b930b3a3-b5bd-4582-a59d-c3a588b06c87 (last visited Mar. 25,
2020) (noting that the plaintiff in Martinez v. Columbia Sportswear USA
Corp., 553 F. App’x 760 (9th Cir. 2013) had filed over 160 similar lawsuits with
the same attorney)[ https://perma.cc/SJV3-KWUM]; see also Olson, supra note
11 (noting that in Pennsylvania between late May and the Winter of 2004, one
firm filed more than one hundred ADA suits on behalf of two complainants).
84.
See Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) (declaring the plaintiff a “vexatious litigant”).
85.
Vexatious Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
86.
See Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (citing the five organizations as Access 4 All, Inc.; Access Now, Inc.;
Association for Disabled Americans, Inc.; Access for America, Inc.; and Access
for Disabled, Inc.).
87.
See Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. Taylor Inn Enters., Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 2d 962, 967 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (noting that the law firm of Fuller, Fuller
& Associates in the present case had pursued numerous ADA actions: at least
forty-one in the Eastern District of Michigan and dozens of actions against
various hotels throughout New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and D.C.);
Access 4 All, Inc. v. HI 57 Hotel, LLC, No. 04 Civ. 6620 (GBD)(FM), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2695, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that Fuller, Fuller &
Associates had represented plaintiffs in at least ninety-two ADA actions in the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York between 2004 and 2006); Molski
v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating
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two plaintiffs to bring numerous ADA suits. 88 “Just five
attorneys and a handful of plaintiffs brought almost two thirds
of the nearly 700 disabled-access suits in Florida’s southern
district in 2013.” 89
These statistics give rise to the term “career plaintiffs,”
alleging that many litigants make their living from suing
businesses under the ADA and its state counterparts. 90 One
attorney indicated at a hearing that her client traveled the
southeastern United States looking for establishments that fail
to satisfy ADA requirements. 91 The client then contacted
Accessibility Disability Consultants and obtained counsel to file
suit. 92 In that case, the court was left with the “inescapable
conclusion” that plaintiff and his counsel were “engaging in
legalized extortion.” 93 The court also noted, “[I]t seems unlikely
that Congress intended the ADA to be used as a hammer with
which to extort fees and costs from non-compliant
establishments.” 94
The widespread practice of filing large numbers of suits
under ADA’s Title III and then joining state law claims for
damages has drawn the notice and commentary of a number of
courts. 95 Courts that chastise repeat plaintiffs point to their
that the counsel in the present case had filed at least 223 ADA violation
lawsuits).
88.
See Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (asserting
that the law firm in the present case was counsel of record in at least fortyone ADA cases filed in the Eastern District of Michigan and of those, at least
thirty were brought by the same plaintiffs).
89.
Shipley & Maines, supra note 12.
90.
See Glass, supra note 13 (interviewing one plaintiff who “has no other
job” than filing ADA suits).
91.
See Hoewischer v. Mardini, No. 3:12-cv-3-J-20JRK, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 186558, at *10–11 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2012) (“At the hearing, Counsel
indicated that her client, Norman Hoewischer, travels the southeastern
United States looking for establishments which fail to satisfy ADA
requirements.”).
92.
Id. at *10–11.
93.
Id. at *10.
94.
See id. at *11 (expressing concern that the plaintiff’s main motivation
for filing these lawsuits was to line his pockets and those of his attorney).
95.
See, e.g., Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208,
1214–15 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (stating that the plaintiff in the case had “filed many
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alleged motives of obtaining monetary damages or attorney’s
fees instead of increasing accessibility. 96 Some courts
specifically state their doubt in plaintiffs’ pure intentions while
others merely allude to bad motives. 97
E. Who Benefits from Repeat Filing?
“Drive-by” lawsuits brought solely to recover attorney’s fees
or statutory damages undoubtedly harm business and business
owners—but who reaps the benefits? 98 Plaintiffs filing in states
that grant monetary awards certainly benefit from collecting
damages. Even when states do not allow for monetary awards,
observers express speculation of plaintiff-attorney “schemes,”
alleging that the relationship may be financially beneficial for
the plaintiff once the attorney has recovered for fees and costs. 99
Title III lawsuits—indeed, more than he can remember,” and comparing this
to the pattern of vexatious plaintiffs in similar lawsuits); Doran v. Del Taco,
Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (asserting that the ADA has
been distorted to generate attorney’s fees and given rise to “a cottage
industry”); Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (including a section in the opinion entitled “A Cottage Industry is Born,”
asserting that the ADA has become a scheme to recover attorney’s fees instead
of a way to promote accessibility).
96.
See, e.g., Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Serial plaintiffs, like Molski, serve as ‘professional pawns in
an ongoing scheme to bilk attorney’s fees.’ It is a ‘type of shotgun litigation
[that] undermines both the spirit and purpose of the ADA.’”).
97.
Compare Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (declaring the plaintiff a “vexatious litigant” and requiring
him to obtain leave of court before filing any further ADA claims in the
district); with Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D.
Fla. 2004) (detailing plaintiff’s financial situation of being unemployed and
supporting his family on social security and food stamps while also frequently
traveling throughout Florida, which has resulted in at least fifty-four
accessibility lawsuits, and questioning routes plaintiff took in his travels).
98.
See Amy Kjose Anderson, Drive-By Lawsuits and the Abuse of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Jan. 24,
2017),
https://www.alec.org/article/drive-by-lawsuits-and-the-abuse-of-theamericans-with-disabilities-act/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (describing how
“drive-by” lawsuits harm businesses and business owners) [https://perma.cc
/2ZQD-QW3V].
99.
See Olson, supra note 11 (referencing the common “cozy
relationships” between complainants and their counsel engaged in serial ADA
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Although unscrupulous plaintiffs may benefit financially,
litigation should ultimately bring about accessibility,
benefitting all disabled Americans. 100 Accessibility non-profits
that are engaged in repeat litigation state that lawsuits are the
only way achieve this goal. 101 Bob Cohen, head of Access for the
Disabled, a non-profit in Florida, expressed his frustration:
The properties ignore the law. They are aware of it, but they
do nothing until a lawsuit is brought up. We tried for five
years nothing but letters and personal phone contacts with
restaurants and hotels, and we get no place . . . . We got
extremely frustrated with the lack of cooperation. 102

On the other hand, some established activists and groups
disagree. 103 Individual activists and disability organizations
have expressed their disdain for the “ADA shakedown
racket.” 104 One disability advocate noted that “you catch more
flies with honey than vinegar” when discussing his advocacy
philosophy. 105 He focuses on positive advocacy methods like
educating communities and consulting with business owners on
accessibility. 106 Activists have formed organizations and
consulting businesses to encourage private facility owners to
engage in voluntary compliance, convincing businesses that
litigation and noting that several prominent ADA attorneys bring numerous
suits on behalf of disabled family members).
100.
See Anderson, supra note 98 (“Lawsuits aiming to bring about
compliance with an important equal rights law like the ADA are important in
advancing the cause, but some of the serial litigators are doing more to rake
in damages than increase accessibility.”).
101.
See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12 (quoting disability advocates
explaining that letters and personal phone calls did not have any effect of
accessibility enforcement).
102.
Id.
103.
See infra notes 104–108 (explaining the views expressed by these
activist groups).
104.
See Olson, supra note 11 (quoting one veteran activist saying he was
appalled by the “grind-’em-out restaurant lawsuits”).
105.
Matthew Shapiro, 6 Wheels Consulting Disability Podcast—Episode
18 (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.6wheelsconsulting.com/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2020) [https://perma.cc/36E9-XUUU].
106.
See id. (“I usually try to go the education route.”).
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being accessible to all consumers is beneficial for their business
model and the entire community. 107 “Nearly all the established
activist groups say they try to work with business owners to fix
violations before running off to court. Many are emphatic that
they view litigation as a last resort.” 108
1. Repeat Plaintiffs’ Response to Criticism
Repeat filers continue to emphasize that lawsuits are
necessary to force reluctant business owners to meet
accommodation standards of the ADA. 109 Thomas B. Bacon, who
has represented plaintiffs in more than 300 disabled-access
cases, notes that the only people who enforce the ADA are the
few repeat plaintiffs and their attorneys. 110 This is true.
Congress intended for the ADA to be enforced through private
citizens initiating litigation. 111
Although the U.S. Government occasionally files suit
against noncompliant business owners, the ADA was designed
to empower private citizens to bring claims. 112 Congress
authorized courts to award attorney’s fees in order to incentivize
private attorneys to represent disabled individuals in Title III
lawsuits. 113 Private suits brought by members of the public
107.
See id. (discussing Matthew Shapiro’s business, “6 Wheels
Consulting, LLC,” and “Access Mob” in Pittsburgh, PA).
108.
Olson, supra note 11; see also Shapiro, supra note 105 (describing
activists’ use of positive reinforcement by explaining to businesses that
promoting accessibility enhances their clientele).
109.
See Lean, supra note 29 (making the comparison of lawsuits for
disability discrimination to racial discrimination and noting that the public
would not object to filings of the former).
110.
See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12. (“‘The only people who enforce
the ADA are these few plaintiffs and their attorneys,’ said Thomas B. Bacon,
a Cooper City attorney who has represented plaintiffs in more than 300
disabled-access cases.”).
111.
See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the
congressional intent to put enforcement in the hands of private citizens).
112.
See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
remedies under the ADA and the need for private citizens to bring suits in
order to enforce ADA compliance).
113.
See 28 C.F.R. § 36.505 (2015) (allowing the prevailing party to recover
a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs).
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relieve the burden on the Department of Justice from inspecting
every business that could potentially be committing an ADA
violation. 114 Private suits are the primary tool used to enforce
the ADA due to the minimal role played by the Attorney General
115

Alternatively, private litigation may no longer be an
effective method of enforcement. 116 Many cases settle before
making it to court because most businesses opt to mediate
“when faced with costly litigation and a potentially drastic
judgment against them.” 117 Abusive plaintiffs use the threat of
lawsuits and money damages as an effective inducement to
settle quickly. 118 Owners often see the choice to settle as a

114.
See Helia Garrido Hull, Vexatious Litigants and the ADA: Strategies
to Fairly Address the Need to Improve Access for Individuals with Disabilities,
26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 77–78 (2016) (“Recognizing the inability of
the U.S. government to adequately address the myriad of accessibility
violations that may emerge throughout the country, Congress also encouraged
private enforcement under Title III.”); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA
Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (noting the Department of Justice has
devoted a small amount of lawyers to disability rights enforcement and those
lawyers are responsible for enforcing the ADA against state and local
governments as well as private entities).
115.
See Adam A. Milani, Wheelchair Users Who Lack “Standing”: Another
Procedural Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and III of the ADA, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69, 108–13 (2004) (noting that the DOJ’s Disability
Rights Section only has “a small cadre of lawyers to bring actions and enforce”
multiple sections of the ADA and initiated fewer cases in 2002 than 2001).
116.
See infra notes 117–127 (explaining why private litigation may no
longer be an effective method of enforcement).
117.
See Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (vacated on grounds of denial of attorney’s fees); see also Denise
Johnson, Why Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act are Rising,
INS. J. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016
/10/07/428774.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (explaining how claims are
rising because, in part, lawyers are finding it a lucrative practice) [https://
perma.cc/XA9T-THFH].
118.
See Wilson v. Kayo Oil Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1071 (S.D. Cal.
2007) (reinforcing that the ADA could be used for the illegitimate purpose of
“preying on businesses across the country in hopes of extorting quick
settlements”).
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business decision. 119 Mediation is highly incentivized since it
may cost three times more to file a motion to dismiss than to
settle the suit out of court. 120 Technical violations of the ADA
are easy to prove and plaintiffs usually win. 121 An unsuccessful
defense could render a business owner liable for paying two sets
of attorneys in addition to the damage costs imposed by a
court. 122 In Florida, some sources place the average settlements
at $16,000, “while the cost of fighting the case can easily land in
the hundreds of thousands of dollars.” 123 One California bar
owner decided to fight an ADA lawsuit and had to declare
bankruptcy after he was ordered to pay $145,000 to compensate
his opponent’s lawyers. 124 Although anecdotal evidence points to
119.
See Johnson, supra note 117 (explaining that mediation is much
cheaper than going to court).
120.
See, e.g., O’Campo v. Ghoman, No. 2:08-cv-1624, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120027, at *27 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (awarding plaintiff $12,000 in
statutory damages and awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys $86,000 in fees and
costs, all at cost to the defendant business owner); Moore v. Millennium
Acquisitions, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01401-DAD-SAB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40722, *29 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (awarding the plaintiff $65,928.03 in
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses); Fortson v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. CV
11-01454 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62496, *31 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013)
(awarding plaintiff $155,944.27 in attorney’s fees and costs); see also Johnson,
supra note 117 (explaining how lawyers are finding ADA suits lucrative).
121.
See George King, ADA Violations: What to Do If You Are Sued, LANG
& KLAIN (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.lang-klain.com/blog/ada-lawsuits (last
visited on Apr. 8, 2020) (“Typically, the property owner is sued for technical
violations of ADA standards for handicapped parking signs. These signs were
often compliant when installed, but are now non-compliant because the
standards were changed in 2010.”) [https://perma.cc/DS9T-ULMP]; Mark
Pulliam, The ADA Litigation Monster, CITY J. (Spring 2017), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/ada-litigation-monster-15128.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2020)
(“[P]laintiffs can recover their ‘costs’ and ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees’ if they
prevail (and merely proving technical noncompliance is sufficient to win).”)
[https://perma.cc/X9QU-9Z5D].
122.
See Hull, supra note 114 (discussing the disincentive for attorneys to
settle for corrective action instead of money and the incentive for businesses
to settle rather than risk litigation).
123.
Evan Gibbs, Stopping Drive-By Lawsuits, ABOVE THE L. (Oct. 2,
2017),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/10/stopping-drive-by-lawsuits
(last
visited on Mar. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/EJ3E-V2KR].
124.
See Olson, supra note 11 (“River City Brewing, a popular downtown
Sacramento bar, decided to fight an ADA lawsuit and eventually had to
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an average settlement of $45,000 in California, this high
average pales in comparison to cases where defendant business
owners have fought the claims in court. 125 Plaintiffs in
California lawsuits have been awarded upwards of $155,000 in
attorney’s fees and costs, which does not account for the
attorney’s fees and litigation costs incurred by the business
owner’s counsel. 126 As a result, cases end in hasty payouts that
fail to correct the violations they are supposed to address. 127
Plaintiffs who file suit with the goal of settling are not
furthering the ADA’s mission of compliance. 128 There is little, if
any, enforcement of compliance once a settlement has been
reached. 129 Even though filing a lawsuit and ultimately
reaching a settlement may draw attention to the
noncompliance, it does little to remedy the barrier for future

declare bankruptcy, after a court ordered it to pay $145,000 to compensate the
disabled complainant’s lawyers.”).
125.
See Hull, supra note 114 (“One California lawyer who specializes in
disability-access suits said the average settlement for ADA lawsuits in
California was $45,000 in 2013.”).
126.
See Fortson v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. CV 11-01454 LB, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 62496, at *31 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013) (awarding plaintiff
$155,944.27 in attorney’s fees and costs).
127.
See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12 (explaining the negative effects
of the rise of ADA litigation); see also O’Campo v. Ghoman, No. 2:08-cv-1624,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120027, at *23 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (“Much of the
difference between this action and routine ADA cases that proceed to a motion
for default judgment can be explained by the fact that the defendants in this
action initially appeared and defended, forcing plaintiff’s counsel to expend
time conducting discovery, conferring with defense counsel, etc.”).
128.
See Leslie Lee, Giving Disabled Testers Access to Federal Courts: Why
Standing Doctrine Is Not the Right Solution to Abusive ADA Litigation, 19 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L 319, 343 (showing why settling does not further the goal of
the ADA).
129.
See id. (“When an ADA lawsuit ends in settlement, monetary awards
are paid directly to plaintiffs and their attorneys, and not expended on
removing barriers to access.”); see also ADA Notification Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 106
Cong. 49 (2000) (quoting Representative Charles Canady as stating, “The lure
of large attorney’s fees is so great that attorneys may even settle cases for
attractive sums for themselves by agreeing to terms by which a property would
not even be fully accessible under the requirements of the ADA.”).
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disabled customers. 130 Currently, “there is no effective means to
[e]nsure that these private actions actually result in changes
that provide increased access to individuals with disabilities.” 131
One code enforcement officer in Florida stated that claimants do
not care whether the violation is fixed once a business pays a
settlement and the lawsuit disappears. 132 Courts have alleged
that “a plaintiff files suit, extracts a cash settlement, and loses
all interest in the defendant’s future compliance with the
ADA.” 133 One restaurant owner in Florida stated that he agreed
to pay more than $12,000 in plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in
settlement, but did not have enough money to fix the violations
of his establishment after the payout. 134 He stated that so far,
no one has come back to check. 135
Business owners assert they would voluntarily spend the
money to come into compliance if they were aware of the
violations, but advocates disagree. 136 Leaders in the disability
law community of Florida assert that letter-writing campaigns

130.
See Bagenstos, supra note 114, at 33 (arguing that the mere filing of
a settlement would alert other potential plaintiffs, giving the business “every
incentive to make its premises accessible”).
131.
Hull, supra note 114.
132.
See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12 (quoting a Delray Beach code
enforcement officer stating that businesses “pay between $5,000 and $12,000
and it goes away . . . . People are taking complete advantage. It’s a
moneymaker. It has nothing to do with compliance.”).
133.
See Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1215
(S.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that because the plaintiff is focused on a short-term
reward, the ADA lawsuit provides little, if any, long-term assistance to
disabled persons generally); see also Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F.
Supp. 2d 860, 866 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (questioning the plaintiff’s good faith and
intention of actually litigating the suit on the merits and asserting that
“Molski’s m.o. is clear: sue, settle, and move on to the next suit.”).
134.
See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12 (“One Palm Beach restaurant
owner confided to the Sun Sentinel that he agreed in a settlement to pay more
than $12,000 in plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, but didn’t have enough cash after
forking over those costs to fix all of the violations in his establishment.”).
135.
See id. (“So far, he said, nobody’s come back to check [if he fixed the
violations.”).
136.
See supra Part II.E (discussing advocates’ assertions that businesses
do not come into compliance without lawsuits).
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and personal phone calls do not work. 137 Established activist
groups say they try to work with business owners to fix
violations before filing suit, but businesses only come into
compliance when faced with litigation. 138 Advocates point out
that businesses have had since 1990 to learn the standards set
forth in the ADA. 139
It has therefore become clear that while some litigants may
be fighting for compliance among business owners, this may not
be not the case for all. 140 Courts discuss the tactics of insincere
plaintiffs whose goals are to win monetary damages instead of
compliance. 141 Some repeat plaintiffs are well known in their
respected districts as serial filers who “target small businesses
that default or settle.” 142

137.
See supra Part II.E (illustrating attempts and varied methodology to
encourage businesses to comply with the ADA).
138.
Olson, supra note 11 (suggesting litigation is the only method to drive
businesses toward compliance).
139.
See id. (noting advocates’ opposition to proposed notification
requirements since it would provide a safe-harbor period, which businesses
had when the ADA was enacted).
140.
See Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (“This is not a
case to vindicate a disabled person’s rights; it is a case brought to extract a
money settlement from a restaurant in Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the
ADA’s jurisdictional hook to achieve that goal.”).
141.
See Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D.
Fla. 2004) (noting that the same plaintiffs filed “hundreds of lawsuits against
establishments they purportedly visit regularly” and this type of “shotgun
litigation undermines both the spirit and the purpose of the ADA.”); see also
Young v. Mahasager, No. 03-6443 (MJD/JGL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48896,
at *9–10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2005) (recognizing the plaintiff’s disingenuous
motive evidenced by the plaintiff’s thirteen pending suits against hotels in the
same area and expressing skepticism that plaintiff was genuine in his desire
to return to all thirteen hotels).
142.
See Cankat v. 41st Ave. Rest. Corp., No. 15 CV 4963 (SJ) (MDG), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171406, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (referencing the
forty-three ADA cases in the same district with nearly identical claims and
that future filings by serial filers should be strictly scrutinized); Molski v.
Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that
while plaintiff had filed hundreds of identical suits, not one had been litigated
on the merits).

ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

713

It is difficult to combat abusive litigation when some
plaintiffs are working toward a more accessible United States
while others use the law for personal gain. One serial litigant
who filed at least 500 ADA lawsuits in California considered
expanding his operations to Las Vegas. 143 He ultimately decided
against expanding, since Nevada “‘does not have damage
provisions’ for access violations.” 144 In the past, this plaintiff has
informed the businesses he has sued “that they can settle out of
court for $10,700 or so,” compared to the hundreds of thousands
they might incur in a lengthy court battle. 145
Under the ADA, plaintiffs’ damages are limited to
injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. 146 Therefore, notifying
businesses of their non-compliance and achieving voluntary
compliance may be a more rational solution for the good-faith
plaintiff. 147 Courts argue that rational plaintiffs who are
genuinely working for accessibility would inform the business of
their violations instead of immediately filing suit. 148 Courts
have noted, however, that vexatious litigation is additionally
beneficial to attorneys specializing in ADA litigation. 149

143.
See Olson, supra note 11 (describing a man who “has filed at least 500
lawsuits against a wide variety of firms—from Sears, Blockbuster Video, and
McDonald’s to small mom-and-pop proprietorships”).
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying discussion (outlining the
remedies for private plaintiffs as injunctive relief remedying the violation and
attorney’s fees and costs).
147.
See Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281–82 (M.D.
Fla. 2004) (arguing that plaintiffs irrationally rush to file suit because pre-suit
settlements do not vest plaintiffs’ counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s
fees and “the current ADA lawsuit binge is, therefore, essentially driven by
economics—that is, the economics of attorney’s fees”).
148.
See id. at 1281 (noting that “conciliation and voluntary compliance”
would be “a more rational solution” than “rush[ing] to file suit”).
149.
See id. at 1281–82 (noting that “pre-suit settlements do not vest
plaintiffs’ counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s fees”).
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2. Attorneys Benefitting from Vexatious Litigation
Countless courts have chastised abusive litigants’ counsel
for turning the ADA into “a fee-generating mill for [] lawyers to
exploit the statutory scheme to see how many billable hours
they [can] cram into a case.” 150 “Courts throughout the country
have raised concerns about this type of serial ADA litigation to
take advantage of the statute’s attorney’s fees provision.” 151
When considering why a plaintiff would not attempt to engage
the business owner in voluntary compliance, one court stated:
Why would an individual like Plaintiff be in such a rush to
file suit when only injunctive relief is available? Wouldn’t
conciliation and voluntary compliance be a more rational
solution? Of course it would, but pre-suit settlements do not
vest plaintiffs’ counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s fees.
Moreover, if a plaintiff forbears and attempts pre-litigation
resolution, someone else may come along and sue first. The
current ADA lawsuit binge is, therefore, essentially driven
by economics—that is, the economics of attorney’s fees. 152

Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of fee-shifting
statutes, practitioners who rely on statutory attorney’s fees will
typically earn lower hourly rates than their counterparts with
fee-paying clients. 153 Statutory attorney’s fees are calculated by
the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel reasonably expended,
multiplied by a “reasonable hourly rate” for counsel’s services. 154
Some attorneys may take advantage of the fees provision by

150.
See Brother v. Miami Hotel Invs., Ltd., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (stating that these lawyers do a disservice to the disabled and
the lawyers who carry out their duties under the ADA with professionalism).
151.
See Shariff v. Beach 90th St. Realty Corp., No. 11 CV 2551
(ENV)(LB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180185, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2013); see
also Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *8 (“Courts across the country have long recognized the
‘cottage industry’ of ADA lawyers who bring a large number of ADA suits to
extract attorney’s fees, which is authorized under the ADA.”).
152.
Rodriguez, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1281–82.
153.
See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 602 (2010) (explaining the lodestar
method of calculating fees).
154.
See id. (explaining the lodestar method of calculating fees).
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attempting to recover for outlandish fees. 155 Courts have
frequently pointed to attorneys’ use of identical complaints and
attempting to recover fees and costs for redundant work. 156
III. Attempted Solutions
Opponents of abusive ADA litigation have attempted in
various ways to eradicate abuse. Judges have exercised their
discretion to curb abusive litigants, and both state and federal
legislatures have attempted to pass legislation targeted at
limiting abuse. 157 Although there is no empirical data for how
successful these attempts have been, this Note analyzes these
efforts in order to understand what may be the most effective
solutions to implement in the future.
A. Judicial Discretion
1. Limiting Attorney’s Fees
Judges have the narrow discretion to reduce attorney’s fees
in cases of vexatious litigation. 158 Courts have stated that when
155.
See, e.g., Shariff, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180185, at *16–18
(discussing the “unwarranted” attorney’s fees sought by plaintiff).
156.
See id. (noting the growing concern for the “cottage industry” of using
ADA litigation to recover attorney’s fees and the plaintiff’s similar seventeen
cases in the same district alone using the same “boilerplate language” for all
claims, therefore reducing the attorney’s award of fees); Access 4 All, Inc. v.
Grandview Hotel Ltd. P’ship, No. CV 04-4368 (TCP) (MLO), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15603, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006) (stating that the plaintiffs and
their attorneys had pursued dozens of Title III actions against hotels in the
area and because the cases involved “identical legal issues and similar factual
issues,” the duplicitous nature of the litigation warranted a reduction in the
law firm’s award).
157.
See, e.g., Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (D.
Haw. 2000) (outlining in great detail the numerous district court cases in
which ADA claimants failed to show immediate threat of injury); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 41-1492.08(E) (2017) (stating that, under Arizona’s version of the ADA,
a plaintiff cannot file suit until she has notified the business of a violation then
given the business thirty days to remedy the issue).
158.
See cases cited supra note 156 (discussing cases in which a judge
decided to reduce attorney’s fees for plaintiffs who had filed many similar
suits).
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attorneys file virtually identical “cookie-cutter” Title III
complaints, they should be able to litigate similar cases in an
efficient and formulaic manner. 159 In such cases, attorneys
cannot request unnecessary expenses, and courts have limited
their recovery accordingly. 160
Courts assign attorney’s fees by calculating (1) the
reasonable number of hours expended, and (2) the reasonable
hourly rate for each participating attorney; however, courts may
also consider extraneous factors to determine whether to adjust
this figure accordingly. 161 Repeat litigants often file identical
“boilerplate complaints” for their suits, which a court may
decide warrants a downward adjustment. 162 A court may also
adjust attorney’s fees downward when “the majority of the law
in each motion is identical, thus rendering much of the legal
research largely unnecessary.” 163 Several courts have taken this

159.
See Brother v. Miami Hotels Invs., Ltd., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1236–
38 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (noting that many of the plaintiff’s attorney’s hours were
“redundant or of such an assembly-line nature based on the similarity of the
tasks . . . to the many other cases filed by counsel” and could have easily been
“spit out by a word processing program”).
160.
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (giving courts the
power to adjust attorney’s fees “upward or downward” accordingly); see also
Brother, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1236–38 (reducing the plaintiff’s attorney’s hours
reasonably expended from 76.1 to 33, 51.3 to 25, and 20 to 25 to 12 due to the
duplicitous nature of the “boilerplate” complaints identical to previous ones
filed by the attorneys); Kennedy v. Spiegel, No. 15-81621-CV-Rosenberg
/Hopkins, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163155, at *7–9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2016)
(noting that plaintiff’s attorney had represented plaintiff in at least seventyfive other ADA cases in the same district and reducing the attorney’s hourly
rate from the requested $420 to $300 and his hours expended from 37.3 to 27.3
due to the duplicitous nature of the suit).
161.
See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc. 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th
Cir. 1974) (stating twelve factors to be considered in whether to adjust the
lodestar calculation upward or downward); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.,
526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (adopting the twelve Johnson factors for the
Ninth Circuit).
162.
See Gilmore v. Elmwood S., LLC, No. 6:11-md-2299, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33584, at *12–15 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 2015) (noting that the lawyers
would essentially “cut-and-paste” complaints, diminishing the lawyers’ claim
of time and labor required and need for legal research).
163.
Id.
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approach, whether their intent is to discourage repeat litigants
or simply reduce attorney’s fees to a reasonable amount. 164
2. Imposing More Strenuous Standing Requirements
on Plaintiffs
Additionally, courts may dismiss a complaint for a
plaintiff’s lack of standing. 165 To satisfy Article III’s standing
requirements, a plaintiff must satisfy three factors. 166 First, a
plaintiff must show she has suffered an injury in fact that is
164.
See Langer v. San Pedro St. Props., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-08780ODW(AFM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191511, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2018)
(reducing $6,035.50 in fees to $600 after considering that the attorney had
filed over 600 cases in the central district of California with nearly identical
complaints and subsequent filings); Love v. Gutierrez, No. CV 18-0872 DSF
KS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186716, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2018) (reducing
the attorneys’ time spent by fifty percent after considering “his repeated
representation of Plaintiff in countless nearly identical ADA cases before this
Court”); Vogel v. Dolanotto, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-02488-ODW-KSx, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 58442, at *12–17 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2018) (reducing attorneys’
requested fees from $32,211.25 to $6,425.88 because plaintiff and his attorney
had filed at least 622 ADA cases in the central district of California and the
attorneys had litigated ADA claims on behalf of Martin Vogel “in hundreds, if
not thousands, of cases”); Kennedy v. Satya Grp., LLC, No. 2:17-CV-14393ROSENBERG/MAYNARD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 3, 2018) (reducing attorney’s fees because plaintiff’s counsel had filed
multiple identical complaints on the same plaintiff’s behalf); Houston v. South
Bay Investors #101, LLC, No. 13-80193-CV-HURLEY/HOPKINS, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 104281, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2013) (reducing attorney’s fees
by thirty-five percent due to the identical complaints submitted by counsel for
the same plaintiff); Access for the Disabled, Inc. v. Mo. Mart, Inc., No. 8:05-cv392-T-23MSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101125, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2006)
(reducing attorney’s fees and considering the eight other identical cases filed
by plaintiff on the same day, also noting that plaintiffs filed a complaint nearly
identical, including typos, in another case); Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v.
Taylor Inn Enters., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967–68 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (noting
that the law firm was counsel of record in at least forty-one ADA cases in the
same district and of those, thirty were brought by the same plaintiffs and with
boilerplate complaints, resulting in a reduced fee).
165.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding
that plaintiffs lacked standing and thus the Court of Appeals had erred in
failing to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
166.
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (citing the factors detailed in Lujan).
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concrete and particularized and actual or imminent. 167 Second,
the injury must be traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant. 168 Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. 169
Many ADA claims have been dismissed for a lack of
standing when the plaintiff has failed to show a real or
immediate threat of injury. 170 For example, if a plaintiff states
that she may “someday” return to the noncompliant
establishment, she has only alleged a speculative injury (as
opposed to a “real and immediate” injury). 171 Courts have
considered a multitude of factors when determining the validity
of a plaintiff’s injury including (1) plaintiff’s personal history of
use of the facility, (2) whether the plaintiff can demonstrate that
she would need to utilize the facility in the future, (3) the
distance between the plaintiff’s home and the defendant facility,
(4) if the alleged barriers are related to plaintiff’s respective
disabilities, and (5) whether the plaintiff actually experienced a
barrier or merely observed one from afar. 172 A plaintiff’s
167.

Id. at 180.
Id.
169.
Id. at 181.
170.
See Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (D. Haw.
2000) (outlining in great detail the numerous district court cases which have
denied standing for claims for lack of immediate threat of injury).
171.
See id. at 1299 (determining that standing did not exist when plaintiff
stated that she would “look into” another trip on defendant cruise line).
172.
See Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357,
1365 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that a personal history of use of a facility and
continued residence in the area supported plaintiff’s contention that he would
likely patronize the facility in the future); Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F.
Supp. 2d 1065, 1079–80 (D. Haw. 2000) (considering the reasonable distance
between the franchise and plaintiff’s residence to establish standing); but see
Brother v. CPL Invs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1368–69 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(determining that that the plaintiff did not have standing because he merely
observed the barriers at a hotel and did not stay the night therefore he did not
suffer an “injury in fact”); Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding that plaintiffs cannot seek relief for all ADA violations, including
those unrelated to his disability); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 320 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (determining that standing did not exist when the plaintiff moved
to a different state from the discriminating establishment); Aikins v. St.
Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329, 1333–34 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
168.
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litigious history may also be weighed to determine standing. 173
This discretion is more powerful in cases when plaintiffs have
filed numerous identical suits. 174
This attempt to deter vexatious claims, however, may not
be a long-term fix. One court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment for a lack of standing, stating that “in view
of his extensive litigation history, [Plaintiff’s] professed intent
to return to the property is insufficient.” 175 The court then
highlighted that “if history is any guide, then [Counsel] and his
clients will adjust to this ruling so that their future filings
satisfy Article III’s standing requirements.” 176
One court used plaintiffs’ lack of standing to dismiss
approximately 1,700 lawsuits filed by a disability-rights
organization, Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities. 177
Judge Talamante granted the Attorney General of Arizona’s
motion to dismiss the organization’s accessibility cases in 2017,
which was followed by a settlement between AID and the
Attorney General permanently barring the group “from filing
frivolous disability lawsuits against Arizona businesses.” 178 The
Attorney General’s motion to dismiss alleged a lack of standing
for the following reasons: (1) plaintiffs failed to allege that they
standing did not exist when the plaintiff could not show that she would need
to use the facility again).
173.
See Brother v. CPL Invs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1369 (S.D. Fla.
2004) (“In light of his extensive litigation, the fact that he never stayed at the
hotel, and his testimony about why he did not keep a subsequent reservation,
the Court does not credit Mr. Brother’s allegation that he intended to
patronize the hotel.”) (emphasis added).
174.
See id. at 1369 (observing that the plaintiff had filed more than fifty
other identical ADA suits in Florida in the last year).
175.
Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
176.
Id.
177.
See Press Release, Off. of Ariz. Attorney Gen. Mark Brnovich, Serial
Litigant Permanently Enjoined from Filing Frivolous ADA Lawsuits Against
AZ Businesses (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.azag.gov/press-release/seriallitigant-permanently-enjoined-filing-frivolous-ada-lawsuits-against-az (last
visited Mar. 7, 2020) (outlining the judge’s granting of the Attorney General’s
motion to dismiss and the concessions made by the advocacy group) [ https://
perma.cc/Y2ZM-P5S6].
178.
Id.
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patronized the businesses they sued, (2) plaintiffs failed to
allege an actual barrier to their access, (3) plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently allege denial of access based upon their particular
identified disability, (4) Arizona does not recognize a
“deterrence” theory of standing, and (5) plaintiffs failed to
provide prior notice or an opportunity to remedy alleged
violations, which is an additional standing requirement for
injunctive relief. 179 The ensuing settlement led to AID, their
affiliates, and successors being permanently enjoined from
filing any new actions in Arizona state courts under either the
ADA or the Arizonans with Disabilities Act, agreeing to have
judgment entered against them for reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs in each case in which they were a party, and paying
$25,000 to the Arizona Attorney General’s Office to be used to
educate businesses regarding ADA compliance. 180 This extreme
measure of barring a disability-rights organization from
bringing suit was seen as a “victory for Arizona consumers and
small businesses.” 181 This was not, however, a victory for
disabled consumers.
In addition to heightened standing requirements, some
courts have used their jurisdictional power to deter the recovery
of monetary damages. In Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, 182 the
court refused to allow the plaintiff to pursue state money
damages through the court’s federal jurisdiction, citing
Congress’s conscious decision to not permit money damages

179.
See Kathryn Palamountain, Arizona Attorney General Secures
Dismissal of 1,700 Lawsuits By Serial Plaintiffs, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Feb.
28,
2017),
https://www.adatitleiii.com/2017/02/arizona-attorney-generalsecures-dismissal-of-1700-lawsuits-by-serial-plaintiffs/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2020) (noting the lack of a written decision laying out the Court’s reasoning,
so it is unclear which of the arguments persuaded the court to issue the
decision) [https://perma.cc/GQ8M-JTZD].
180.
See Press Release, Off. of Ariz. Attorney Gen. Mark Brnovich, supra
note 177 (describing the concessions made by AID which also included
dropping their appeal of the order dismissing the cases).
181.
Id. (quoting Attorney General Mark Brnovich).
182.
See Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (refusing to grant
supplemental jurisdiction to a plaintiff who sought to “misuse” the ADA).
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through litigation under the ADA. 183 The court accused
plaintiffs of exploiting the ADA’s jurisdictional hook to extract
a money settlement from the restaurant. 184 “Thus, the
compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction as
presented by this case is the prevention of the misuse and
exploitation of the ADA in a way that directly contravenes
congressional intent and the remedial nature of the ADA.” 185
3. Sanctioning Abusive Litigants and Their Counsel
Courts have the discretion and authority to impose
sanctions on litigants engaged in abusive litigation or attorneys
who engage in the unethical practice of law. 186 Judges may
impose pre-filing requirements compelling a plaintiff or law
firm to seek leave of court before filing additional ADA claims
when such sanctions may be warranted by “ethical violations,
attorney or plaintiff malfeasance, or the filing of
non-meritorious claims.” 187 Courts have begun to impose
sanctions on serial plaintiffs more frequently in recent years.
One such case, Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 188 the court
declared the plaintiff a vexatious litigant and ordered that he
and his counsel obtain leave of court before filing any more Title
183.
See id. at *4 (alleging plaintiffs’ motive to pursue money damages as
“sidestepping” the intent of the ADA in not creating a private right of action
for compensatory damages).
184.
See id. at *8 (“This is not a case to vindicate a disabled person’s rights;
it is a case brought to extract a money settlement from a restaurant in
Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the ADA’s jurisdictional hook to achieve
that goal.”).
185.
Id. at *9.
186.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2018) (stating that persons who multiply
proceedings “in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct”).
187.
Raetano v. Kally K’S, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-02104-T-17-TGW, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25088, at *24–25 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009) (citing Molski v.
Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d, 500
F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008)).
188.
See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir.
2007) (finding Molski’s history of factual allegations to be contrived and
exaggerated, necessitating pre-filing review of future claims).
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III claims. 189 Molski was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and subsequently followed in district courts in the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, respectively. 190 One district court in New
York, comparing counsel’s ADA litigation tactics to that of
Molski, stated that the conduct of counsel would not be tolerated
and “the Court [would] not be shy about informing the
appropriate state bar authorities and chief judges across the
country should [counsel] unadvisedly continue to litigate in this
fashion.” 191 Although courts often issue opinions speaking
harshly about serial plaintiffs, they are likely reluctant to issue
sanctions since repeat filing under the ADA is not illegal or
unethical per se.
B. Legislative Action
Countless courts, legal scholars, businessmen, politicians,
and even disability advocates have expressed the desire for a
legislative solution to abusive ADA litigation. The Honorable
Anne C. Conway has stated that “the system for adjudicating
disputes under the ADA cries out for a legislative solution.” 192
She has argued that the means for enforcing the ADA—
attorney’s fees—have become more important than the end goal
of accessibility, and only Congress can respond to vexatious
litigation tactics. 193 Individual businesses and business
associations continue to lobby for state and federal
189.
190.

Id.
See Mayes v. PTP Invs., No. 13-5475 LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70369, at *13 (E.D. La. May 21, 2014) (citing Molski but determining that it
was not controlling in the instant case); Segal v. Rickey’s Rest. & Lounge, Inc.,
No. 11-61766-CIV-MARRA/HOPKINS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379, at *19–
20 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2012) (same).
191.
See Costello v. Flatman, LLC, No. 11-CV-287 (SJ)(VVP), 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45860, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (citing United States v.
Morales as evidence of the court’s willingness to sanction attorneys in the past)
(citing United States v. Morales, No. 07 CR 460 (SJ),2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
57924 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2010)).
192.
Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
193.
See id. (“Moreover, the means for enforcing the ADA (attorney’s fees)
have become more important and desirable than the end (accessibility for
disabled individuals.”).
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legislation. 194 For decades, the business community has
demanded a notice-and-cure provision in accessibility
legislation. 195 Some elected officials agree. Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger vetoed a bill standardizing damage awards for
disability discrimination because he believed it did not go far
enough. 196 His veto message asserted he would “welcome
legislation that would provide an avenue for businesses . . . to
correct potential violations prior to being subjected to fines or
civil liability.” 197 Ultimately, many legislative solutions have
been proposed on the state and federal level, with some bills
being passed in state legislatures.

194.
See Mary Johnson, Business Strikes Back: California Firms Press
State Bills to Stop Access Lawsuits, RAGGED EDGE ONLINE (May 2, 2005), http://
www.raggededgemagazine.com/focus/notifact0505.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2020) (noting that a proposed Senate bill implementing a four-month noticeand-cure period was supported by the California Association of Independent
Businesses, the California Chamber of Commerce, and the California Business
Properties Association) [https://perma.cc/K4MS-4UWM]; see also Mike
DeBonis, House Passes Changes to Americans With Disabilities Act Over
Activists’
Objections,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-passes-changes-to-americanswith-disabilities-act-over-activists-objections/2018/02/15/c812c9ea-125b-11e89065-e55346f6de81_story.html?utm_term=.2f9751c3fcbc (last visited Mar. 7,
2020) (citing the International Council of Shopping Centers and the National
Federation of Independent Businesses as supporting legislation to stop driveby lawsuits) [https://perma.cc/R5ED-W22K].
195.
See William Adams, California AB 1521 Now Law: Strongest Measure
Yet to Curb ADA Abuse, ADA DEF. L. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://adadefense.net
/2016/01/07/california-curb-ada-abuse-ab-1521/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020)
(describing a recently passed California law condemning high-frequency
litigants that failed to implement a notice-and-cure provision for businesses)
[https://perma.cc/G87N-8K7L].
196.
See Kevin G. Baker, AB1707 Judiciary !!VETOED!! Disability Access
Denial Penalty, CDR-LEGISLATIVE COMMENTS (Aug. 24, 2004), http://cdrleg.blogspot.com/2004/08/ab1707-judiciary-vetoed-disability.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2020) (stating that the Governor vetoed AB1707 and including the
Governor’s veto message) [https://perma.cc/5WUH-M5A8].
197.
See id. (noting the hopeful public policy goal of ensuring facilities are
open to persons with disabilities and not to penalize businesses financially for
“unintended violations that can easily be corrected”).
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1. State Legislation
States with the most accessibility litigation face heightened
pressure to pass legislation. Some have successfully enacted
legislation aimed at deterring abusive litigants. 198 Arizona’s
legislature recently amended their state accessibility law to
protect businesses from “drive-by lawsuits” following Attorney
General Mark Brnovich’s intervention in 1,000 consolidated
accessibility cases brought by one advocacy organization. 199 The
Phoenix-based advocacy group, Advocates for Individuals with
Disabilities, argued that their “seven-month blitz” of lawsuits
was the only effective method to enforce accessibility
requirements on business owners. 200 The Attorney General’s
office disagreed and requested an expedited ruling, calling the
lawsuits “a concerted effort to improperly use the judicial
system for (AID’s) own enrichment.” 201
Following the legal battle, Arizona amended their state
legislation to protect businesses from “drive-by lawsuits” under
the Arizonans with Disabilities Act (AzDA). 202 Under the new
AzDA, an aggrieved party must provide the noncompliant
198.
See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1492.08(E) (2017); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 425.55(a)(2) (2015); CAL. CIV. CODE § 55.56(e) (2015).
199.
See Caroline Larsen, Arizona Amends State Disabilities Act to Protect
Businesses from Drive-by Lawsuits, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://ogletree.com/insights/2017-04-20
/arizona-amends-state-disabilities-act-to-protect-businesses-from-drive-bylawsuits/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (“Arizona Governor Doug Ducey just
signed into law an amendment to the Arizonans with Disabilities Act (AzDA)
designed to make it more difficult to bring lawsuits against businesses based
on claims that they are not accessible to individuals with disabilities.”).
[https://perma.cc/Z458-96D8].
200.
See Maria Polletta, Arizona Attorney General Intervenes in Flood of
Lawsuits Over Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, ARIZ.
CENT. (Aug. 24, 2016, 6:49 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local
/phoenix/2016/08/24/arizona-attorney-general-intervenes-flood-lawsuits-overcompliance-americans-disabilities-act/89309208/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020)
(quoting Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities as stating that lawsuits
were the “only effective method to wake up business owners” who continued
to ignore federal accessibility requirements, particularly in parking lots)
[https://perma.cc/HE3A-3ZTT].
201.
Id.
202.
Larsen, supra note 199.
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business with written notice of the violation and allow for thirty
days to cure the violation or comply with the law. 203 Only after
satisfying the notice and waiting period can the aggrieved party
file a civil action if the business has not cured the violation. 204 If
the private entity is required to obtain a building permit or
government approval to make the changes, they must provide
the aggrieved party with the corrective action they plan to
pursue. 205 The business is then allowed an additional sixty days
to make the correction. 206 The statute also contains a provision
allowing any party to motion for the court to stay an action in
order to determine whether the plaintiff or their attorney is a
vexatious litigant. 207 While plaintiffs are now required to
provide notice before suing under the state law, these notice
requirements have no effect on litigation under the ADA. 208
California, the leading state in accessibility litigation, has
also attempted to curb abusive plaintiffs. Senate Bill 1186,
enacted in 2012, requires an attorney to provide notice to “a
building owner or tenant with each demand for money or
complaint for any construction-related accessibility claim.” 209
The purpose is to provide the potential defendant with sufficient
facts to identify the basis for the claim. 210 Unlike Arizona, the
law does not require a waiting period to allow the business in
violation to cure the violation. 211 The most recent version of
California’s S.B. 1186, Assembly Bill 1521, extended S.B. 1186
203.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1492.08(E) (2017).
Id.
205.
Id. § 41-1492.08(F).
206.
Id.
207.
Id. § 41-1492.08(I).
208.
See, e.g., H.R. 3765., 114th Cong. (2015) (failing to implement a notice
requirement under the ADA).
209.
S.B. 1186, 2012 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
210.
See id. (“The bill would require an allegation of a construction-related
accessibility claim in a demand letter or complaint to state facts sufficient to
allow a reasonable person to identify the basis for the claim.”).
211.
Compare id. (requiring pre-suit notice to defendants), with ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 41-1492.08(E) (2017) (requiring a thirty-day period between providing
notice and filing a complaint to allow noncompliant businesses to fix their
violations).
204.

726

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 689 (2020)

to 2018 and created additional requirements for suits filed by
high-frequency litigants. 212 Now, serial plaintiffs must state
“whether the complaint is filed by, or on behalf of, a
high-frequency litigant, the number of complaints . . . filed
during the 12 months prior to filing the complaint, and the
reason why the individual visited the place of public
accommodation.” 213
The California legislature also amended its California Code
of Civil Procedure to define “high-frequency litigant.” 214 The act
of defining a “high-frequency litigant” in a state’s Code of Civil
Procedure may seem innocuous, but the legislature drafted this
definition to directly target accessibility claims:
According to information from the California Commission on
Disability Access, more than one-half, or 54 percent, of all
construction-related accessibility complaints filed between
2012 and 2014 were filed by two law firms. Forty-six of all
complaints were filed by a total of 14 parties. Therefore, a
very small number of plaintiffs have filed a
disproportionately large number of construction-related
accessibility claims in the state, from 70 to 300 lawsuits each
year. Moreover, these lawsuits are frequently filed against
small businesses on the basis of boilerplate complaints,
apparently seeking quick cash settlements rather than the
correction of the accessibility violation. This practice unfairly
taints the reputation of other innocent disabled customers
who are merely trying to go about their daily lives . . . . 215

While the new law condemning high-frequency litigants
does not create a legal or procedural hurdle, “it is sure to play a
role in judicial decisions.” 216 The section defines a
“high-frequency litigant” as a person “who utilizes court
resources in actions arising from alleged construction-related
access violations at such a high level that it is appropriate that
212.

A.B. 1521, 2015 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
Id.
214.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.55(a)(2) (2015).
215.
Id.
216.
See Adams, supra note 195 (noting the significance of this new code
and that “[n]ever before has the same state law that created the incentive for
high-frequency litigants also condemned their tactics”).
213.
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additional safeguards apply so as to ensure that the claims are
warranted.” 217 The statute does not say what additional
safeguards judges should apply or how to apply them, but it
significantly empowers judges to apply a higher level of scrutiny
for high-frequency litigants of construction-related accessibility
claims. 218 The law provides a low threshold, specifying that a
high-frequency litigant is a plaintiff who has filed ten or more
complaints alleging an accessibility violation within a twelvemonth period or an attorney who has represented ten or more
high-frequency litigant plaintiffs. 219 In addition to empowering
judges to apply additional safeguards, the law implements “a
‘supplemental’ filing fee for high-frequency litigants of $1,000
per lawsuit.” 220 This may be in response to high-frequency
litigants often controversially filing as “paupers” to avoid paying
basic filing fees. 221
Florida, another hot bed of accessibility litigation, enacted
House Bill 727 in response to the growing number of Title III
cases filed in the state. 222 House Bill 727 allows businesses to
hire an accessibility expert to evaluate their premises for ADA
compliance and subsequently file a certificate of conformity or a
remediation plan with the Florida Department of Business and
Professional Regulation. 223 The law then requires courts to
“consider any remediation plan or certificate of conformity” in
actions alleging a Title III violation. 224 The remediation plan or
certification would be considered when the court “determines if

217.
218.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.55(b) (2015).
See id. (noting that “additional safeguards” are appropriate to ensure
that a high-frequency litigant’s “claims are warranted”).
219.
Id.
220.
Adams, supra note 195.
221.
See id. (arguing that filing as “paupers” is controversial “since given
the settlement amounts and volume, it would appear that high frequency
litigants are involved in a very lucrative endeavor”).
222.
See Gibbs, supra note 123 (describing Florida’s efforts to curb Title
III lawsuits and arguing that federal legislation is necessary “to effectively
curb serial filers and their attorneys”).
223.
H.B. 727, 2017 Leg., 119th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).
224.
Id.
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the plaintiff’s complaint was filed in good faith and if the
plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and costs.” 225
2. Attempted Federal Legislation
Federal legislators have repeatedly introduced bills aimed
at curbing private litigation under the ADA, to no avail. As one
article notes
[In 2013], two U.S. representatives from California
introduced legislation with the goal of amending the [ADA]
to impose notice and compliance opportunities for
defendants before they are hit with lawsuits. But as was the
case with more than a dozen similar pieces of legislation
introduced since 2000 . . . the bills stalled. 226

The ADA Education and Reform Act of 2015 sought to
amend the ADA and add a notice-and-cure period before
commencing a private civil action to curb “unfair and deceptive
acts.” 227 The ADA Education and Reform Act of 2017 passed in
the House in 2018 but failed in the Senate shortly thereafter. 228
Versions of the bill had been “introduced five times altogether
over the last several years,” but this was the first time it had
“reached the U.S. House floor.” 229 Other bills, such as the
Correcting Obstructions to Mediate, Prevent, and Limit
Inaccessibility Act (114 H.R. 4719) and the ADA Notification
Acts of 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013, have
yet to make it past the introduction phase of the legislative
process. 230
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Shipley & Maines, supra note 12.
H.R. 3765, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).
ADA Education and Reform Act of 2017, H.R. 620, 115th Cong.

228.
(2017).
229.
See Dave Biscobing, Bill that Would Try and Stop Drive-by ADA
Lawsuits Passes US House, ABC15.COM (Feb. 16, 2018, 6:10 PM), https://
www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/bill-that-would-try-and-stopdrive-by-ada-lawsuits-passes-us-house (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (citing the
bill’s author, Rep. Ted Poe (R-Texas)) [https://perma.cc/D83E-ZFFL].
230.
H.R. 3590, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 914, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.
728, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2804, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3479, 110th
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3. Potential Problems with Legislative Solutions
Some individuals with disabilities, and even advocates,
support adding a notice-and-cure requirement to the ADA. 231
Specifics of such requirements, though, are hotly debated. 232
How long should a notice-and-cure period last: thirty days, sixty
days, four months? What exactly should the “cure” be: a written
plan to improve accessibility, merely an attempt to resolve the
inaccessibility, or completing construction to remove the
barrier? 233
One failed piece of federal legislation, the “ADA Education
and Reform Act of 2015,” proposed a sixty-day window for
owners to identify the barrier and provide aggrieved individuals
“a written description outlining improvements that will be made
to remove the barrier.” 234 The failed “Correcting Obstructions to
Mediate, Prevent, and Limit Inaccessibility Act” proposed a
notice-and-compliance opportunity of ninety days for an owner
or operator to remove the barrier and correct the violation before
Cong. (2007); H.R. 2397, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 881, 112th Cong. (2011);
H.R. 777, 113th Cong. (2013).
231.
See, e.g., Gordon, Rees, Scully, Mansukhani, LLP, California’s
Legislation to Curb Abusive ADA Lawsuits (2012), https://www.grsm.com
/publications/2012/california-s-legislation-to-curb-abusive-ada-lawsuits (last
visited Mar. 28, 2020) (“There is no right-to-cure language in the revised bill,
but Disability Rights California advocacy director Margaret Johnson called for
a 30-day notice requirement because the purported violations are ‘a
substantial infringement on the civil rights of people with disabilities.’”)
[https://perma.cc/7DC2-3DTQ].
232.
See Heather Ansley, Jennifer Mathis, Vania Leveille, Myths and
Truths About the “ADA Education and Reform Act” (H.R. 620), ACLU.ORG,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/myths_and_truths
_about_the_ada_education_and_reform_act_-_updated_2-13-18.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 28, 2020) (discussing the potential harm to individuals with
disabilities
when
enforcing
a
notice-and-cure
requirement)
[https://perma.cc/F67B-YWR5].
233.
Id. (analyzing the difference between fixing a barrier and making
“substantial progress” in removing a barrier); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S COMMENTS ON THE “ADA EDUCATION AND REFORM
ACT OF 2017” (H.R. 620) (2017) (explaining the concerns of the Civil Rights
Division, which administers and enforces the ADA, with substantial “cure”
times delaying individuals’ rights to accommodations).
234.
H.R. 3765., 114th Cong. (2015).
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a civil action could be brought. 235 Alternatively, if an owner of a
noncompliant business demonstrated a “good faith effort” to
remove the barrier but was not able to do so within ninety days,
he or she would be entitled to an additional thirty days to
comply with accessibility requirements. 236
Most recently, the failed “ADA Education and Reform Act
of 2017,” also known commonly as H.R. 620, suggested a
sixty-day period for the owner to provide the aggrieved person
“with a written description outlining improvements that
[would] be made to remove the barrier.” 237 The owner would
then be required to remove the barrier or “make substantial
progress in removing the barrier” at the end of a 120-day period
beginning on the date the owner received notice. 238 Requiring a
building owner to make “substantial progress” in fixing a
barrier again raises concerns over the subjective nature of the
“cure” part of “notice and cure” bills. What exactly is
“substantial progress”?
4. Advocates’ Response to Legislative “Fixes”
The Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund
(DREDF) outlined eight of the disability community’s main
concerns with the recently proposed H.R. 620 and similar
bills. 239 First, DREDF noted that these types of bills remove
incentives for businesses to become accessible and encourage
businesses to not make changes until they receive “notice” from
potential plaintiffs. 240 Second, DREDF emphasized the
discrimination that individuals with disabilities face every day
235.

H.R. 4719., 114th Cong. (2016).
Id.
237.
H.R. 620, 115th Cong. (2017).
238.
Id.
239.
See Overview of Concerns with H.R. 620, the ADA Education and
Reform Act of 2017, and Similar Bills, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND,
https://dredf.org/hr620/overview-of-concerns-with-h-r-620/ (last visited Mar.
8, 2020) (arguing that H.R. 620 and similar bills significantly weaken the
impact of the ADA) [https://perma.cc/X9VL-JT5V].
240.
See id. (pointing out that today, businesses have an obligation to
become accessible and H.R. 620 would remove these immediate consequences).
236.
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when they are not able to access public accommodations. 241
Third, DREDF noted that these bills place the heavy burden on
individuals with disabilities to send a detailed written notice. 242
For example, H.R. 620 would require a person encountering an
access barrier to “send a written notice specifying in detail the
circumstances under which access was denied, including the
property address, whether a request for assistance was made,
and whether the barrier is permanent or temporary.” 243
Importantly, “no other civil rights law permits businesses to
discriminate without consequence unless and until the victims
of discrimination notify the business that it has violated the
law.” 244
Fourth, DREDF pointed out that these bills would not fix
business’s concerns of monetary damage awards since these
have “nothing to do with the ADA.” 245 The ADA does not permit
recovery of monetary damages through private litigation; the
only remedies are injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. 246
Statutes awarding plaintiffs monetary damages are state law
and therefore not affected by federal legislation like H.R. 620. 247
Fifth, DREDF argued that courts already have the power “ to
address the few unscrupulous attorneys” who may file frivolous

241.
See id. (“The ADA is the difference between participation and
exclusion on a daily basis. Why should a wheelchair user be unable to join her
family at a restaurant, just because the owner has resisted installing a ramp
for 28 years?”).
242.
See id. (“H.R. 620 requires a person with a disability who encounters
an access barrier to send a written notice specifying in detail the
circumstances under which access was denied, including the property address,
whether a request for assistance was made, and whether the barrier is
permanent or temporary.”).
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
245.
See id. (noting that the ADA does not allow for money damages).
246.
See id. (noting that supporters of the bill cite monetary damage
awards as a concern regarding Title III litigation).
247.
See id. (explaining that a congressional amendment to the ADA “will
do nothing to prevent damage awards under state laws”).
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lawsuits. 248 DREDF acknowledges the growing concern over
frivolous lawsuits, but argues the disability community should
not be burdened in order for Congress to remedy the problem of
abusive litigation. 249 Advocates question why courts and state
bar associations cannot sanction abusive litigation when they
“already have extensive power to deal with any frivolous
litigants or their attorneys.” 250 They argue the “existing legal
mechanisms” should be used to combat abusive litigation
instead of “deny[ing] the civil rights established by the ADA.” 251
Sixth, DREDF noted that “[t]he ADA is already very
carefully crafted to take the needs of business owners into
account.” 252 Seventh, it noted that there are already “extensive
federal efforts to assist business compliance,” such as the “indepth DOJ ADA website [], the DOJ ADA hotline, extensive
DOJ technical assistance materials, and the ten federallyfunded regional ADA Centers” that provide resources and
training. 253 Lastly, DREDF emphasized the importance of ADA
standards as not merely “minor details or picky rules, but
rather” essential accessibility standards to ensure access for all
citizens, including individuals with disabilities. 254
IV. Recommendations
Solving “abusive” ADA litigation is inherently challenging
because repeat litigants are not doing anything illegal. This is
how the ADA was designed to enforce accessibility. Filing a
claim against an unassuming business owner for technical
violations (like a disabled access sign being the improper size or
248.
See id. (“For the rare few who may file fraudulent claims or engage in
unscrupulous practices, state courts and state bar associations already have
extensive power to deal with any frivolous litigants or their attorneys.”).
249.
See id. (acknowledging “concerns about frivolous lawsuits or serial
litigants” but arguing that these concerns should be addressed in a way that
does not “deny the civil rights established by the ADA”).
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
253.
Id.
254.
Id.
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a mirror being hung 1.5 inches too high) may seem unfair and
feel intrinsically wrong, but the ADA does not contain provisions
to protect against “frivolous suits” for what some may see as
“minor technicalities.” 255 Additionally, it can be difficult and
dangerous to distinguish between “good” litigants and
“vexatious” litigants. A technical violation may seem
insignificant to most able-bodied individuals, but it could be a
very real obstacle for someone who uses a wheelchair or is
mobility impaired. How, then, can we separate and eliminate
abusive litigation in order to protect businesses while also
defending disabled individuals’ rights? There is no easy solution
to satisfy all parties, but compromise may be manageable. A
multi-tier approach engaging the various parties involved can
be instituted through (1) judicial discretion, (2) mandatory court
approval of settlements, (3) notice-and-cure legislation, and (4)
lawyers’ tools of self-regulation.
A. Empower Courts to Exercise Meaningful Judicial Discretion
As demonstrated in the Introduction of this Note, courts do
not shy away from chastising those they view as abusive
litigants, but they have slowly begun to implement punishments
for that perceived (or concrete) exploitation. 256 Recently, one
court went so far as to order the plaintiff and his attorney to
return all fees and costs they had received back to the
defendant. 257 The court further enjoined the plaintiff and his
255.
See Vicky Nguyen, Jeremy Carroll & Kevin Nious, California
Outpaces Other States in ADA Lawsuits, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 19, 2014),
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/California-Outpaces-OtherStates-in-ADA-Lawsuits-disability-act-246193931.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2020) (distinguishing claims of true embarrassment and inequality, e.g. a
disabled individual having to use the restroom with the door open because her
wheelchair could not fit in the stall, from “technical violations”) [ https://
perma.cc/3KT9-36X7].
256.
See Johnson v. Ocaris Mgmt. Group, No. 18-CV-24586-PCH, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144773, at *27–28 (S.D. Fla. Aug 23, 2019) (sanctioning the
plaintiff’s attorney and ordering plaintiff to return all fees and costs back to
the defendant).
257.
See id. (“Johnson and Dindin shall disgorge all fees and costs
recovered in each of the gas pump cases.”).
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counsel from “filing any ADA complaint in any federal or state
court in Florida or any court outside of Florida without first
obtaining written permission” from the court. 258 The attorney
was then referred to the “Ad Hoc Committee on Attorney
Admissions, Peer Review and Attorney Grievance for
investigation of his actions.” A news article on the court’s
decision quoted a local municipal attorney as saying: “Oh, he is
in deep trouble,” and that the attorney in the case “is personally
looking at potential disbarment.” 259
While such sanctions may curb abusive litigants, the Ninth
Circuit issued a rightful warning to courts taking this kind of
action. 260 Because the ADA is designed to be enforced by private
litigation and does not allow for damages,
most ADA suits are brought by a small number of private
plaintiffs who view themselves as champions of the disabled.
District courts should not condemn such serial litigation as
vexatious as a matter of course. For the ADA to yield its
promise of equal access for the disabled, it may indeed be
necessary and desirable for committed individuals to bring
serial litigation advancing the time when public
accommodations will be complaint with the ADA. 261

Courts should heed this warning and exercise caution when
penalizing vexatious ADA litigants, but they should also use
their judicial discretion as a non-legislative deterrent of truly
abusive litigation.
“Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be
vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence,
respect, and decorum in their presence, and submission to their
258.

Id.
See Casmira Harrison, Federal Judge Deals Body Blow to Attorney at
Center of Serial ADA Lawsuits, THE DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J. (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.news-journalonline.com/news/20190828/federal-judge-dealsbody-blow-to-attorney-at-center-of-serial-ada-lawsuits (last visited Apr. 12,
2020) (describing the court’s ruling to sanction the attorney and return all
money received) [https://perma.cc/GGM7-4CG8].
260.
See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir.
2007) (urging courts to refrain from presuming that serial litigation is
necessarily vexatious).
261.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
259.
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lawful mandates . . . .” 262 “These powers are ‘governed not by
rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.’” 263 Courts are granted the
discretion and authority to impose sanctions on litigants who
bring abusive litigation or attorneys who engage in the
unethical practice of law. 264 Federal courts hold the power to
control admission to the federal bar and discipline attorneys
who appear before them. 265 Although the Supreme Court
cautions that this power ought to be exercised with great
caution, it is nevertheless available to all courts. 266
Judge Talamante’s dismissal of over 1,000 accessibility
complaints demonstrates the potential danger of judicial
discretion. 267 Increasing judicial power may harm advocates
attempting to enforce accessibility. Courts should be wary in
making standing requirements more strenuous for ADA
plaintiffs. Requiring disabled individuals to demonstrate real
injuries at a heightened standard could create real hurdles for
disabled individuals attempting to force compliance. 268 Certain
262.

Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821).
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Link v.
Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).
264.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2018) (stating that persons who multiply
proceedings “in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct”).
265.
See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824) (stating that the power to
discipline attorneys is incidental to all courts and necessary for the
preservation of decorum and the respectability of the profession).
266.
See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (discussing a court’s “inherent power to
impose attorney’s fees as a sanction for bad-faith conduct” and stating that a
court must “exercise caution in invoking” that power).
267.
See Press Release, Off. of Ariz. Attorney Gen. Mark Brnovich, supra
note 177 (noting that Judge Talamante “dismissed more than 1,000 lawsuits
filed by Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities”).
268.
See Vanita Gupta, Oppose the “ADA Education and Reform Act of
2017” (H.R. 620), THE LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (Feb. 14, 2018),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2018/oppose-hr-620-adaeducation-reform.pdf. (“H.R. 620 would impose a burdensome process before
people with disabilities could file a civil action for an accessibility violation in
a public accommodation case.”) [https://perma.cc/5PNU-SQP6].
263.
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barriers may not be seen as “real and concrete” injuries when
considered by able-bodied judges who have not had the
experience of navigating the world in a disabled body. A judge
may view a “barrier” as merely a minor technical violation, but
even something minor can bar an individual with a lack of
mobility from navigating a business.
Alternatively, judges should turn their heightened
discretion to attorneys. Several courts have begun to consider
whether attorney’s fees should be withheld if no advance notice
and opportunity to cure was given to the defendant. 269 One court
in California attempted to require a pre-litigation notice before
allowing attorney’s fees in ADA cases, but this attempt at
discretion was vacated by the Ninth Circuit. 270 Still, courts
continue to discuss whether plaintiffs provided notice to the
defendant when deciding to grant judgment for the defendant
or reduce attorney’s fees. 271
B. Court Approval of Settlements
Congress can amend the ADA to mandate judicial approval
of out-of-court settlements. New legislation could deter abusive
litigants whose sole motives are to obtain monetary settlements
269.
See Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (denying attorney’s fees “when a pre-suit letter to the Defendant would
have achieved the same result” (citing Macort v. Checker Drive-In Rests., Inc.,
No. 8:03-cv-1328-T-30EAJ 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2437, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
28, 2005))).
270.
See Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 237 F. App’x 148, 149 (9th Cir. 2007)
(stating that the district court should have either set a reasonable fee award
or given specific, valid reasons for its denial of fees but “instead it denied fees
by subjecting Doran to a requirement not found in the ADA or the case law”).
271.
See Doran, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (“This court is not inclined to
award attorney’s fees for prosecuting a lawsuit when a pre-suit letter to the
Defendant would have achieved the same result.”); Rodriguez v. Investco,
LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (“There was no effort to
communicate with the property owner to encourage voluntary compliance, no
warning and no offer to forbear during a reasonable period of time while
remedial measures are taken.”); Brother v. Miami Hotel Invs., Ltd., 341 F.
Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“No effort was made to communicate
with Defendant and seek compliance before suit, despite the fact that the only
remedy in the act is injunctive relief. That is, aside from attorney’s fees . . . .”).

ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

737

instead of fixing the business’s inaccessibility. Generally,
“‘[f]ederal courts are not vested with a general power to review
and approve settlements of suits between private parties,’
although a number of exceptions exist by both statute and
rule.” 272 There are several circumstances which warrant judicial
approval of a settlement, including: (1) cases involving minors
or wrongful death, 273 (2) class action suits, 274 and (3) when
required by law, for example, in Fair Labor Standards Act or
False Claims Act cases. These circumstances warrant judicial
approval in order to protect the public interest.
State law governs the judicial approval of settlements
involving minors, parties who are incompetent or otherwise lack
the capacity to waive rights knowingly and intelligently, and
wrongful death cases. 275 While states may vary on their policy,
the root concern for courts is to protect the interest of minors
and others unable to advocate for their interest. 276 The public
272.
Kanu v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., No. DKC 15-3445, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 89166, at *10–11 (D. Md. July 11, 2016) (quoting Estate of
Sa’Adoon v. Prince, 660 F. Supp. 2d 723, 724–25 (E.D. Va. 2009)).
273.
See generally Reed ex rel. Reed v. United States, 891 F.2d 878, 881
n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Florida law requires court approval of all settlements
involving a minor for the settlement to be effective.”); Goesel v. Boley Int’l
(H.K.) Ltd., 9-6 F.3d 414, 419 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We join our colleagues in other
federal courts in characterizing judicial approval of settlements involving
minors as a matter of substantive law.”).
274.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval for settlements of
class actions).
275.
Compare Kanu, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89166, at *10–11 (identifying
Maryland law which determines the federal court does not have authority to
approve settlements involving minors unless both parents are deceased and
the next friend is not in loco parentis), with Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Lowman,
No. 5:01-CV-891-BO(3), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29328, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 5,
2003) (“However, in a settlement involving minors, Local Civil Rule 17.1(b)
requires the parties to prepare and submit a proposed Order of
Approval . . . .”); see also Allianz Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 153 F.R.D. 89, 98 n. 4 (E.D.
Va. 1994) (“New Jersey law requires court approval of settlements of infants’
claims . . . . The same is true in Virginia.”).
276.
See Donnarumma v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 79 F.R.D. 455, 464
(C.D. Cal. 1978) (“On the other hand, where minors are involved, the Court,
whose root concern and responsibility is with protecting their interests, simply
cannot ignore the difficulty this poses to its efforts to grapple with the fees
question.”).
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has an interest in protecting those who cannot speak for
themselves in litigation. Similarly, it is in the public interest to
enforce accessibility and protect businesses from abusive
litigation meant to extract cash settlements.
Second, ADA lawsuits can be thought of as a type of class
action. A class action is “a lawsuit in which the court authorizes
a single person or a small group of people to represent the
interests of a larger group.” 277 Private lawsuits to enforce the
ADA represent the interests of all individuals with disabilities
and society’s interest in fair and equal treatment of all under
the law. Class actions are governed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 23. 278 FRCP 23(e) regulates settlements of
class action suits. 279 After the parties have notified all members
of the class of the proposed settlement, the court may approve
the settlement “only after a hearing and only on a finding that
it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 280 By treating ADA
settlements similarly to class action suits, courts can act as a
safeguard to ensure proposed ADA settlements (1) are not a
windfall for abusive litigants, (2) fix the litigated barrier, and
(3) promote the interests of the ADA.
Lastly, settlements under certain federal statutes, like the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and False Claims Act, must
be approved for fairness by a district court. 281 “The
congressional purpose of the FLSA and the public’s interest in
the transparency of the judicial process decisively inform both
the procedure and the standard applicable to a district court’s
review of an FLSA settlement.” 282 This statement applies
277.

Class Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
279.
See id. (providing the requirements of a class action suit).
280.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
281.
See Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(“In accordance with the common law requirement that settlement of an FLSA
claim be approved for fairness by a district court . . . .” (citing Lynn’s Food
Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982))); United
States ex rel. Pratt v. Alliant Techsystems, 50 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (reviewing a settlement agreement under the False Claims Act for
whether it was “fair and reasonable”).
282.
Dees v. Hydradry, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
278.
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perfectly to the need for court approval of ADA settlements.
Similarly, “where a private right is granted in the public
interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so
charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed
where it would thwart the legislative policy with which it was
designed to effectuate.” 283 Courts should bear the responsibility
of ensuring that disability rights, which are upheld through
private suits, continue to protect public interests.
C. Notice-and-Cure Legislative Action
Ultimately, the legal profession and courts are limited in
their ability to limit abusive ADA litigation. The ADA is
functioning exactly as Congress intended. 284 Without legislative
action, abusive litigants will continue to exploit the legal system
for monetary gain at the expense of business owners. The
determination must be whether legislation should be passed on
the state or federal level as well as what measures will protect
business interests while safeguarding disability rights.
Vexatious ADA litigation is arguably a state issue since
accessibility lawsuits vary by state and correlate to states’
legislation; however, enacting uniform federal regulations may
provide a more sensible and longer-lasting solution.
Adding a notice-and-cure provision to the ADA will allow
the “honest but unfortunate” business owner to act in good faith
and fix their violations before being subject to costly litigation.
Congress must determine (1) the requirements of the notice
given to business owners, (2) the length of the cure period, and
(3) the definition of a “cure.” To limit the burden on disabled
individuals, the notice should only require “sufficient enough
detail” for the business owner to identify the barrier or violation.
The notice should not require additional burdens such as citing
the specific code, explaining how the barrier prevented the
283.
See Rogan v. Essex Cty. News Co., 65 F. Supp. 82, 83 (D.N.J. 1946)
(refusing to approve a private settlement which had been negotiated without
knowledge of the court, in absence of clear showing that statutory
requirements had been met).
284.
See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the
congressional intent to put enforcement in the hands of private citizens).
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individual’s access, or whether the barrier is temporary or
permanent. 285
How long, then, should business owners be allowed to “cure”
their noncompliance? Disability advocates argue passionately
against long “cure” periods since, in theory, they prescribe a set
amount of time the disabled individual will not be able to access
the facility. Cure periods have been proposed for thirty, sixty,
and ninety days. 286 Sixty or ninety days may seem like a long
period of time, but the alternative solution—litigation—is a
lengthy and extensive process which can take months or years.
After litigation has concluded, the judge will then order the
business to satisfy the injunctive relief of fixing the barrier
within a certain amount of time. Litigation significantly
prolongs the remedy of the violation. A defined period of thirty
days to fix a barrier will incentivize business owners to comply
quickly and avoid litigation.
Suggested “cures” have included many options from fully
eliminating the barrier to merely notifying the complainant of
what the owner plans to do in the future. 287 Violations which are
fixable in thirty days should be completely cured as such. If the
barrier requires construction work for removal, the owner shall
obtain the proper permits, hire the appropriate renovator, and
begin construction within thirty days. Owners should notify the
complainant of the progress he has made and may have an
additional thirty or sixty days depending on the appropriate
amount of time to fully eliminate the barrier. Courts should be
allowed the opportunity to consider extenuating circumstances
of construction-related barriers in subsequent litigation.

285.
But see H.R. 620, 115th Cong. (2017) (requiring a person encountering
an access barrier to send written notice specifying in detail the circumstances
under which access was denied, the property address, whether a request for
assistance was made, and whether the barrier is permanent or temporary).
286.
See supra notes 234–237 (discussing proposed notice requirements
and cure periods).
287.
See supra notes 234–238 (discussing various proposed threshold
requirements of business owners’ mitigation efforts).
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D. Encourage Lawyers to Self-Regulate
As a last resort, judges can look to the legal community to
self-regulate and sanction attorneys abusing the system. 288 The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct direct attorneys to act
ethically and professionally. 289 The legal profession carries the
burden of self-governance to keep attorneys accountable. 290 To
maintain the integrity of the profession, a lawyer who knows of
misconduct by a fellow attorney “shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.” 291 Violating the Rules of Professional
Conduct is professional misconduct. 292 Under Rule 3.1, “[a]
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is
a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous . . . .” 293
If an attorney’s repeat litigation of ADA claims rises to the level
of being frivolous, a fellow attorney may report him to the state
bar. 294
It is also professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 295
An attorney abusing his power to bring ADA litigation for the
purpose of attorney’s fees or hefty settlements may rise to the
level of being prejudicial to the administration of justice. 296
288.
See supra notes 256–259 (discussing one case in which the court
sanctioned counsel for frivolous litigation).
289.
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
290.
See id. (explaining the importance of self-governance among members
of the legal profession).
291.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
292.
See id. r. 8.4(a) (providing that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to . . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct”).
293.
Id. r. 3.1.
294.
See id. r. 8.3 (providing for peer reporting).
295.
Id. r. 8.4(d).
296.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 COMMENT (AM. BAR ASS’N
2016) (discussing offenses that interfere with the administration of justice and
stating that “[a] pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance
when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.”);
Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (“This is not a case to vindicate a
disabled person’s rights; it is a case brought to extract a money settlement
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State bars are in place to maintain the integrity of the legal
profession. Attorneys should be disciplined for exploiting the
ADA solely for the benefit of attorney’s fees or monetary
settlements that do not fix the litigated barriers. 297 The legal
profession has the means to penalize attorneys who take
advantage of disabled individuals within legislative boundaries
and should penalize those attorneys accordingly.
V. Conclusion
Abusive ADA litigation negatively affects not only business
owners but the disability community and legal profession as
well. The need for reform is apparent but should not come at the
cost of equal rights for all Americans. The entire legal system
must work together to eliminate unscrupulous plaintiffs’ ability
to profit off unsuspecting businesses without placing further
burdens the disability community and hindering their right to
equal access.

from a restaurant in Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the ADA’s
jurisdictional hook to achieve that goal.”).
297.
See id. (reading the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to disavow
this as behavior that would be prejudicial to the administration of justice).

